Is the Importance of Formation Over-Emphasised in the Modern Game?
Amongst both the media and the fans in the terraces it’s becoming more and more common to hear debate regarding formation: “4-3-3 is more fluid; 4-4-2 is outdatedâ€, “ but 4-4-2 gives the side more balanceâ€, but can we really deduce such things from formation? Certainly such sweeping generalisations seem wide of the mark, as, for example, most would consider the 4-4-2 formation Spain played during the majority of Euro2008 to be a more fluid style than the 4-3-3 style José Mourinho has become known for at Porto, Chelsea and Inter.
In reality, formation tells us very little about a team’s style of play. It tells us nothing, for example, about how direct or patient the team is or a team’s marking style or whether a team plays a high or deep defensive line or whether a team prefers to press high up the pitch or stand-off the opposition when not in possession of the ball or the team’s basic mentality etc. etc. Another thing it fails to tell us is how these teams actually line-up in different stages of the match. It’s all well and good labelling teams with certain formations before kick-off, but the differences in the shape of two teams of the same formation when, for example, not in possession of the ball can be great. One team may chose to drop a player back while defending, briefly turning midfielders into defensive midfielders, or even centre-backs. Whereas another may chose to attack the team in possession with a high pressing game. Similarly, the team in possession may decide to briefly turn midfielders into attacking midfielders or full-backs into wingers, maybe not even due to the intentions of the manager, but on a whim from the player himself.
The fluidity of the modern game also means many of these formations have become blurred and distorted anyway. The line-up of the midfield in particular has become far more sophisticated in the modern game with the line of what constitutes as a midfielder or a defender or a midfielder or an attacker becoming increasingly blurred. Wingers have become increasingly interchangeable in regards to being categorised as either a midfielder or a forward for example. Teams’ shape nowadays is far too complex to assign arbitrary numbers to 3 different supposed rows of players. What counts as 4-4-2 or a 4-3-3 anyway? 4-2-3-1 can be identical to a 4-3-3, bar one central midfielder standing slightly further forward as lining up for kick-off, and 4-3-3 and 4-5-1 are often exactly the same thing, yet many will still praise teams for playing 4-3-3 for being an inherently attacking formation and ridicule teams for playing apparently an apparently “negative†4-5-1 style. Again to use the example of Spain; the formation they used in the final of Euro2008, shifting from their usual 4-4-2 due to an injury to David Villa, was a pretty standard 4-5-1 formation, even with the use a holding midfielder. The exact type of formation many would deride as “negative†and “anti-football,†despite the fluidity of Spain’s play on the pitch. Categorising formation seems to have become virtually worthless.
It’s true that previously unknown formation changes in the past have led to success. Alf Ramsey’s 4-1-3-2 system, the precursor to the modern 4-4-2 led England to World Cup victory in 1966 and similarly, 20 years later Carlos Bilardo’s (pictured below, alongside Diego Maradona) revolutionary 3-5-2 formation, which popularised the usage of “wing-backs†helped lead Argentina to glory in the same competition in 1986. Though, while this change in style of play almost certainly played its part in helping leaf both sides to victory in those tournaments, it may not have been down to the simple changing of player position. As Bobby Charlton remarked after England had gone to then European champions Spain in a friendly and won 2-0 in the lead up to the 1966 World Cup: “The Spanish fullbacks were just looking at each other while we were going in droves through the middle.†It was England’s continual play through the centre of the park and rarity of them playing the ball out wide that flummoxed defenders, as their opposition were set up expecting players to be bombing up and down the wing. It was not so much simply being different in terms where the players stood in relation to each other, but rather how this was exploited and used to effect. Another advantage of course was simply how their new style had not been analysed by opposition managers yet, an advantage that is probably non-existent in the modern game due to the sophisticated tactical analysis computer programmes around today.
One other thing of course was that both sides had good players. Contrary to the popular myth, Argentina were far from a one man team in 1986. This is a team who conceded just 3 goals before the final, so it’s hard then to place all their importance on one player, particularly an attacking one. Wing-back Sergio Bastista has become a legendary name at Argentinos Juniors for his defensive capabilities and Nery Pumpido’s inch perfect passing became essential to the team’s quick counter attacking style, and yes, they had Diego Maradona in their side too. Whereas that England side had one of the meanest defences in World Cup history, not conceding a single goal from open play until the final.
It’s all well and good categorising 4-3-3 as being more “fluid†or “expressive†than 4-4-2, but if it’s a 4-3-3 formation made up of a team of Emile Heskey’s, compared to a team made up of Lionel Messi’s, you can guarantee it won’t be. It’s the players in those formations and the style in which they are built around that make those formations work or not, not the formations themselves.
